This paper investigates, for the first time, the reactions of markets to the monetary policy decisions of their own Central Bank and to the decisions of the Central Banks of other countries. In particular, using daily interest rates to estimate the impact of the monetary policy announcements of a Central Bank, we analyse the effect of the FED, ECB, and BoE monetary policy announcements on their own markets, and on the others. Surprisingly, we find that while the US rates respond only to FED announcements, and the British rates respond mainly to BoE announcements and marginally to FED announcements, the response of Euro bond rates to the FED announcements is stronger than their response to ECB announcements.
Introduction
The main instrument of monetary policy is the setting of Central Bank rates, which can either follow a "reaction function" -Taylor rule -or be decided on a discretionary basis. In both cases it is very important how the Central Bank announces its policy.
In the 1990's numerous studies analysed the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, focusing particularly on the reaction of market interest rates to the decisions and, more generally, to the monetary policy announcements of Central Banks.
In our opinion, knowing how markets respond to monetary policy announcements is of extreme importance for both financial operators and monetary authorities: operators want to know how monetary policy will affect their decisions, and the Central Bank wishes to know how its decision on interest rates is transmitted to the market and how much autonomy to determine rates it actually enjoys.
It is interesting, with the increased globalization of financial markets, to look also at how domestic interest rates are influenced by the monetary policy announcements of other central Banks.
The aim of this study is to examine how the announcements of a Central Bank are reflected on its domestic market and to what extent they are able to influence the financial markets of other countries. We analyse the effects of the FED's, the ECB's, and the BoE's monetary policy announcements on their own and other markets, using future rates to separate expected from unexpected policy decisions. In accordance with the efficient markets hypothesis, we show that the response of domestic interest rates to the surprise component of monetary policy is stronger than the expected component of policy action, but we also find that Euro interest rates respond significantly to FED announcements. This amounts to a temporary loss of monetary sovereignty for Europe's Central Banks.
More generally, this finding can be used to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy: it is in fact essential for a Central Bank to take account of the capacity of others to communicate and of the leadership effects this has, if it wishes to conserve its sovereignty over its own yield curves at all times.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the channels through which monetary policy announcements by the Central Bank of one country can cause changes on the domestic market of another country.
The third section is a review of earlier studies assessing market reactions to monetary policy actions. The fourth section describes the use of future prices to obtain a measure of the expectations of monetary policy announcements. The fifth section describes the empirical model we estimate, while the following sections describe the results we obtain.
Transmission channel
What are the channels through which monetary policy announcements by the Central Bank of one country can cause changes on the domestic market of another country? Generally speaking there are three main channels. The first depends on the regime in which the monetary policy is set. Some Central Banks do in fact set themselves the target of stabilizing a relationship in which one of the two variables involved is controlled by a foreign central Bank. This occurs for example when monetary policy seeks to stabilize the exchange rate. In this case, monetary policy is determined by an exogenous variable controlled by a foreign Central Bank. When that foreign central Bank announces a change in its monetary policy, this change also is transmitted to the other monetary market.
The second channel is connected with the growing integration of financial markets and the relative spillover effects. An announcement by one Central Bank can in fact create arbitrage phenomena which tend to be eliminated by movements of capital. Since the transaction costs of transferring capital from one market to another are low in integrated financial markets, an announcement by a foreign Central Bank will generate capital flows which will have an impact on its domestic financial markets.
Finally, the third channel is connected with the publishing of macroeconomic data. A monetary policy announcement by a Central Bank may reveal important economic information concerning another country. Consider, for example, an economic outlook which contains explicit references to the economic conditions of other economies or in any case useful information for forecasting the economic performance of other countries.
A review of earlier studies
An early paper assessing market reactions to monetary policy actions is that of Cook and Hahn (1989) , who examined the one-day response of bond rates to changes in the target Fed Funds rate from 1974 through 1979.
Cook and Hahn begin by compiling a record of the changes in the Federal
Reserve's target over this period. They examine both the records of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (which implemented the changes) and the reports of the changes in The Wall Street Journal. As Cook and Hahn describe it, the actual Federal funds rate moves closely with the Federal Reserve's target. Moreover it is highly unlikely that the Federal Reserve was changing the target in response to factors that would have moved the funds rate even in the absence of the policy changes, i.e. it is unlikely that in the absence of the Federal Reserve's actions the Federal funds rate would have moved by discrete amounts. Their procedure was to regress the change in the bill, note, and bond rates on the change in the Fed's target funds rate for a sample consisting of 75 days during which the Fed had changed the funds rate target. They find that the response to the target rate increases is positive and significant at all maturities, but noticeably smaller at the long end of the yield curve. In addition, Cook and Hahn examine the relationship between changes in interest rates and future changes in the target, but they find little evidence that the target rate changes were anticipated.
In contrast with this research, Roley and Sellon (1995) , using Cook and Hahn's eventstudy approach to the 1987-1995 period, find a statistically insignificant response of bond rates to changes in the target funds rate.
Later on, more sophisticated econometric procedures were used. Edelberg and Marshall (1996) , using a VAR (Vector Autoregressive) model to study monetary policy, found a large response of bill rates to policy shocks, and a small response of bond rates.
In 2001, Kuttner used the Federal Funds rate futures to separate expected from unexpected changes in the Federal Funds target rate. Examining the impact of monetary policy on bill, note, and bond yields, the author showed that the response of interest rates to expected changes is insignificant, while the response to unexpected change is statistically significant and relevant to explain the impact of monetary policy changes. These results support the hypothesis of rational expectations of economic agents.
Perez-Quiros and J. Sicilia (2002) examined the predictability of the monetary policy of the ECB and analysed the impact of monetary policy decisions on the yield curve, using daily data. As regards predictability, their evidence suggested that markets have not been surprised by monetary policy decisions of the ECB, i.e. markets have been able to predict the Governing Council's decisions on key ECB interest rates fairly accurately.
As regards transmission of the unexpected component of monetary policy decisions to the yield curve, they provide evidence that meetings smooth out the impact of the monetary policy shocks (daily changes in short-term interest rates) which have been generated outside meeting days. Ross (2002) looking at the relations between monetary policy announcements and the market's reaction, makes a comparative analysis on the market's ability to understand the ECB's, FED's, and BoE's decisions. In this work it appears that the market is able to anticipate correctly the FED's and the BoE's decisions. With regard to the ECB, the market has difficulty to anticipate changes in the interest rate. The author thinks that this may be explained by the larger number of meetings, which are a source of confusion.
Various studies on money markets in the literature consider the importance of foreign announcements to domestic markets. Kim, Kortian and Sheen(2000) look at the Australian financial market. They find that American macroeconomic news affects Australian interest rates.
In another study Gravelle and Moessner (2001) this risk premium to be relatively small for the short time horizons that will be used in this paper.
The approach we use to measure the expectation is similar to Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) .
The idea is to compute the difference between two appropriate future prices. This difference should represent the surprise generated by the monetary policy announcement.
Following this line, we can interpret the future price at time t − 1 (f t−1 )
as the conditional expectation (conditioned with respect to the information set I) 2 of the spot rate (r) at the maturity date (m).
Then, the surprise (∆r u t ) will be given by the change in the conditional expectation:
Once we have a surprise generated by monetary policy decisions we can measure market's expectations (∆r e t ) as:
2 Technically, the information set I is a σ−field.
where ∆r t is the change in the interest rate operated by the monetary policy authority.
The empirical models
To investigate the presence of Central Bank leadership we estimate two different empirical models.
The first examines the impact of a Central Bank announcement on interest rates, while the second is used to study the possibility of international interdependence.
The first model we estimate is the model described by Cook and Hahn We estimate the following equation:
where R is the rate examined, β is the response to expected and unexpected changes to the target.
In the model we estimate, ∆R is computed as the one-day response 5 to monetary policy decision. In this way we can outline market's adjustment 3 Poole, Rasche, Thornton (2002) underline that the use of the OLS method of estimation could give distorted results. The distortion is due to the different ways in which markets process new information. They nevertheless also affirm that the differences between estimates made using the OLS method and those made using the "errors in variable" method are generally very small. 4 In actual fact the change is calculated between the rate on the day of the announcement and the rate on the following day. 5 See the appendix for details about the timing of the fixing of the interest rate. To address the question of a possible dependence of interest rates on a Central Bank announcements more accurately, we estimate a second model.
This specification is similar to the previous one, but in this case we run a multivariate regression. We run an OLS regression where the dependent variable is a one-day response of interest rates, while the exogenous variables are the surprises generated by two Central Bank announcements. In particular, when a Central Bank announces we have the surprise of this announcement, while the surprise generated by the other Central Bank (on this nonannouncements day) is by definition equal to zero. and it should not react to ∆r u,o t . As we can understand, we expect the interest rates respond to the "domestic" Central Bank's surprise more than the "other" Central Bank's surprise.
The sample for the analysis
The analysis covers the period 1st January 1999 through to 31st October 2005, and our data-set comes from DATASTREAM.
First of all, the analysis is based on the variations of prices (future prices or interest rates) on the relevant day. The difference between these prices, measured on the appropriate day, is relevant for detecting the new information given by the Central Bank announcement. As can be understood the timing of both the announcements and the fixing of the interest rates is very important 6 .
During the period covered by our analysis we have outlined the monetary policy meetings of the three Central Banks. It is important to note that we consider all meetings and not only those followed by a monetary policy change. This is justified by the fact that every meeting gives information that helps operators to form their expectations, influencing the trend of interest rates. In the period analysed the ECB had a greater number of meetings than the FED and the BoE (Table 1) , the ECB had 117 meetings, 6 In the appendix we write these important details.
the FED 54, and the BoE 82 7 .
Insert them by a quarter-point in 10.98% and it reduced them by a quarter-point and a half-point respectively in 13.41% and 2.44% of its meetings.
The results
We have divided the results of our analysis in two main parts: the first one concerns the first specification given by (3), while the second one concerns the second specification given by (4). The main econometric results are reported in Tables 2-7 for the equation (3), while for the equation (4) are reported in Tables 8-9 . The estimates are expressed in percentage points. 7 For the FED we use unscheduled meetings as well. 8 See, http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2001/html/is011108.en.html
The p-values are obtained using the semiparametric-bootstrap method. In particular, we use 399 Bootstrap sample replications 9 .
All our estimates show that the effect of monetary policy varies across the maturity spectrum: it is larger for short-term rates, and diminishes with longer maturities. This finding confirms Cook and Hahn (1989), Rudebush (1995), Thornton (1998) , Kuttner (2001) , and it is well explained in Thornton (1998), and Thornton (2005). Table 3 shows the impact of the BoE.
The results of the first specification

Insert table 3 here
The Bank of England seems able to control its yields curve up to a maturity of one year. The influence of the BoE's decisions is stronger on the LIBOR one year than on the LIBOR 1 month rate. Of course, it is possible to explain this by recalling that the BoE does not use a specific target for the shorter interest rates, preferring to focus on the longer one.
Euro interest rates appear sensitive to the BoE's monetary policy decisions.
Both Euribor one-month and one-year interest rates show a ready response to the unexpected monetary policy change. Again the coincidence of BoE and ECB's meetings may be relevant. As for the ECB, the US rates do not react to BoE's announcements.
Finally, consider the Federal Reserve from Table 4 .
Insert table 4 here
First of all, as we would expect both the one month and one year US interbank interest rates react to FED announcements strongly. In particular, we see that short term interest rates reflect the variation announced almost Having examined the response of monetary markets to the monetary policy announcements of the three Central Banks under study here, we will now focus on an analysis of the longer term markets, those of bonds. As is known, the rates that are set in those markets constitute indicators used by many economic operators in their decision making.
It would seem plausible to expect each bank to control the time structure of its own rates and therefore Euro, US, and British market rates should respond principally to the announcements of the ECB, FED and the BoE respectively and only marginally to other announcements.
The results of this analysis are given in tables 5, 6 and 7. Table 5 shows the response of interest rates to ECB changes in MRO on Euro, American, and British markets, while table 6 gives the response to BoE changes in repos on these markets and finally table 7 shows the response to FED changes in the federal fund target on the same markets.
As with the analysis of money markets, we expect that the intercept and expected response coefficients are approximately equal to zero or statistically not significant. This confirms that interest rates only respond to new elements in the monetary policy announcements.
Insert table 5 here
Examination of table 5 shows that the unexpected response to ECB's announcements for 2, 5, and 10 year rates in the euro area is statistically significant. This coefficient becomes rapidly less significant with longer term maturity dates, which leads to the conclusion that the ECB has a degree of influence on the time structure of its rates up to maturities of 10 years.
The ECB's decisions seem to have an irrelevant impact on interest rates in the American bond market, because the estimates show a low R square, and the p-values of the estimated coefficients are not significant at least at the usual 5% level. On the contrary, the British market reacts to ECB announcements. Again, the fact that ECB meetings and BoE meetings are often on the same days could be the main reason. Another reason is that the Great Britain has not yet decided to enter the EMU and the expectation on that decision can play a role in explaining why operators listen to ECB announcements.
Insert table 6 here
The same analysis of table 6 shows that the BoE also effectively moves the time structure of its interest rates up to maturities of 30 years and here too the unexpected response coefficient is fairly substantial, especially for 2 and 5 year rates. As with the ECB announcements BoE decisions seem to have an irrelevant impact on interest rates in the American bond market.
On the contrary, the Euro responds to the BoE's decisions, and as before, the main reason could be that the BoE's meetings and the ECB's meeting are often on the same days.
Insert table 7 here
If we now look at table 7, which shows the role of FED announcements on the Euro, British and American markets, we see rather interesting results. The results that emerge from this comparative analysis are therefore extremely interesting. While it is true that the ECB and the BoE control the time structure of their own rates fairly significantly up to 5 years, it is also true that the FED not only controls the same rates up to almost 30 years for the Euro, but these rates seem to respond more strongly to FED announcements than they do to those of the ECB. While the British market, on the other hand, responds to FED announcements for the 2 and 5 year maturity, the impact of FED announcements is quite similar to those of the BoE. Moreover, the impact of FED announcements is limited to these maturities while the impact of BoE announcements remains significant up to 30 year maturity.
In brief, what seems to emerge is a dependence of Euro bond rates on FED announcements while this is less evident for the British bond market.
We may find further evidence using the results of the next subsection.
The results of the second specification
From the previous subsection, we have obtained some evidence in favour of a FED leadership on European rates. This leadership seems to be stronger for Euro rates than the British rates. In order to study this FED's leadership both on Euro markets and British market we run two separate regressions.
In the first one, we use the FED's surprise and the ECB's surprise to explain the response of Euro interest rates and for the second one, we use FED's surprises and the BoE's surprises to explain the response of British interest rates. In other words, we try to study the FED's surprise as a determinant of the Euro and British interest rates response.
Furthermore, we choose to make this vis à vis comparison to account for announcements being made on the same day, and this fact is relevant for the ECB and BoE meetings, while it is irrelevant for the other meetings. Of course, we do not consider the American market because we do not find any response of US's rates to ECB and BoE announcements from the previous specifications.
We leave the analysis of the relation between ECB and BoE announcements on EMU and British market for further research, mainly because these relations are complicated by two reasons. The first is that, as outlined above, many ECB meetings happened on the same days as BoE meetings and of course this can create confusion in deciding whether the market actually responds to ECB or BoE decisions. The second is that Great Britain
has not yet decided to enter the EMU, and expectations of this decision may play an important role.
The econometric result of the estimates of equation (4) are reported in Table 8 and in Table 9 . As outlined above, we estimate the equation (4) to study the likelihood that the surprise measures are correlated even on nonsurprise days with the one-day response of the interest rates, and in this way to get evidence of interdependence (dependence) effect.
Insert Table 8 here
As can be seen from Table 8 , Euro interest rates react to the surprise component of ECB monetary policy announcements up to 10 year maturities, at least at the usual 5% level. But surprisingly and more important, there is a significant response for all maturities considered at the usual 5% level for the response of interest rates to the surprise component of FED announcements, and this response is stronger than the ECB's surprise for all maturities ranging from 2 year to 30 year.
Insert Table 9 here
Looking at Table 9 , we find evidence that the British interest rates do not react to the FED's surprise announcements. The coefficients of the reaction of UK interest rates to BoE's surprise announcements are significant and greater than the correspondent coefficients of FED's surprise announcements. Furthermore the latter are never significant at the 5% level.
Clearly, these results are further and strong evidence of a dependence of Euro interest rates on FED announcements, while the same cannot be said of British interest rates.
Conclusion
This study analyses, for the first time, the reactions of markets to the mon- statements were rather contradictory in this respect in its first few years 13 .
While its statements on interest rates have become more consistent in recent years, its statements on growth and inflation are still ambiguous.
A third element, strictly connected with the previous one, is the reputation of the bank itself. This reputation is a direct function of the Central Bank's ability to pursue the monetary policy objectives that it sets itself.
Financial operators could therefore place their trust in the good reputation of the FED, while they are still unable to judge the ability of the ECB. The ECB is in fact too young for operators to be able to express an opinion on its ability to achieve the monetary policy objectives it sets itself, especially in the long term.
While the ECB's reputation is young, the same cannot be said of the BoE, which is the oldest Central Bank in the world. Looking at the results, the BoE does not seem to be subject to FED leadership: the BoE demonstrates that it knows how to adjust its rates, which are not very sensitive to FED announcements. 12 The fact that the FED today is discussing the adoption of targets (Wang, J., 2005) , when Greenspan retires, seems to underline the importance of the reputation and communicative skills of the current FED chairman. 13 
Timing Issues
The timing is a very important aspect when working with daily data, and this is particularly true in our study.
The decisions on the key interest rates for the euro area are announced in a press release issued at 13:45 C.E.T. 
